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This dissertation analyses ex-ante asymmetric performance fee structures used by
South African Mutual Funds and estimates performance fees some time before the
fees are paid. Certain parties might benefit from having a reasonable estimate of
its value. We use spread option theory to value ex-ante performance fees. The data
consist of monthly benchmark and fund gross returns from December 1999 to Octo-
ber 2014. The theoretical value of ex-ante performance fees is a function of spread
volatility, therefore high spread volatilities give rise to high ex-ante performance fees.
Ex-ante performance fee estimates are highly sensitive to the correlation between
the fund and benchmark and a low positive correlation gives rise to a high ex-ante
performance fee. The distribution of ex-ante performance fees is positively skewed
because of the maximum function in the payoff. Ex-ante performance fee estimates
obtained are lower than the actual performance fees paid.
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Investment companies are compensated for managing their clients’ assets through
management fees and performance/incentive fees. These two types of fees form the
total compensation paid to investment companies for managing their clients’ assets.
In South Africa about 20 percent of unit trust asset managers have a reward scheme
that is comprised of both management fees and performance fees (Treasury, 2013).
Performance fees are rare in the United States of America because of the Investment
Amendment Act of 1970 (Thomas and Jaye, 2006). This Act only allows investment
companies to charge a symmetric fee structure, therefore very few funds are willing
to use a compensation scheme that penalises underperformance. Performance fees
are quite common in Europe and a lot of research has been done in this field of study
in papers by Elton, Gruber and Blake (2003), Drago, Lazzari and Navone (2010)
and Pohjanpalo (2013) to mention a few.
Management fees are calculated as a fixed percentage of assets under manage-
ment (AUM) and accrue regardless of the manager’s performance, whereas perfor-
mance fees only accrue when the fund manager outperforms a pre-set target. There
are different ways in which performance fees are calculated but the simplest way is
to take the difference between the portfolio return and a relative benchmark, scaled
by a factor called the participation rate. These different ways of calculating incen-
tive fees are referred to as performance fee structures. We shall list performance fee
structures we consider in this dissertation in Chapter 2.1.
Since there are different methods of calculating performance fees, many research
papers have questioned their appropriateness and also the way these fees are cal-
culated because there is no standard way of calculating performance fees. In this
dissertation we investigate the use of option pricing theory to estimate performance
fees some time before the fee is paid, because certain parties might benefit from
having a reasonable estimate of its value. Value here could simply mean the best
estimate for the fee itself, given the information at that time, or perhaps the hy-
pothetical market value of the right to receive the fee. We shall compare ex-ante
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performance fee values we obtain to the actual performance fees paid to determine
whether these spread option theory valuation techniques are useful.
We estimate ex-ante performance fees under the real world measure P and the
risk-neutral measure Q.
1.1 Performance Fee Categories
Performance fees are classified into two broad categories: fulcrum fees (symmetri-
cal fees) and bonus plan fees (asymmetrical fees), (Starks, 1987). Fulcrum fees are
calculated simply as the difference between the fund and benchmark returns (out-
performance), scaled by a participation rate. The payoff of a symmetric fee payoff
is given as
TC = [b0 + b1(RF −RB)]×AUM ,
where TC is the total compensation payable to the manager, b0 is the management
fee, b1 is the participation rate (a fraction of the full excess return that the manager
gets), RF is the fund return, RB is the benchmark return and AUM is assets under
management.
If the return of the benchmark is more than that of the fund, the amount is
deducted from the management fee, therefore this can result in a lower management
fee or a negative fee. We can avoid this scenario by specifying a floor, i.e., an amount
A (the maximum amount they can lose, which can be negative) to the payoff in above
to get
TC = [b0 + b1max(RF −RB,A)]×AUM .
The Equation above looks more like an asymmetric (bonus) fee structure, except
that the manager’s loss is capped and the cap (A) can be a number less than zero.
For examples if the difference between the fund and benchmark return is −6% and
A is −2% the manager only loses −2%.
A bonus plan fee is calculated as the maximum between outperformance and
zero, also scaled by a participation rate. Therefore in the case of a bonus plan fee,
managers hold a free call option and are not penalised directly for underperforming.
The payoff of an asymmetric fee payoff is given as
TC = [b0 + b1max(RF −RB, 0)]×AUM .
In South Africa, a modified version of the bonus plan is generally used (Treasury,
2013). Fund managers get rewarded for outperforming a benchmark and in the case
of underperformance, they should exceed previous trading period’s losses before be-
ing able to charge performance fees. This is referred to as setting a high-water
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mark. These high-water marks are imposed to prevent fund managers from taking
excessive risk at the expense of the investor. Incentive fees can encourage tourna-
ment behaviour, which is adjusting the risk of the portfolio depending on whether
the fund manager has outperformed or underperformed a benchmark to maximise
performance fees (Treasury, 2013). This might not be a big issue since fund man-
agers are also concerned about their reputation (Chevalier and Ellison, 1998) which
means there is a downside to taking excessive risk and in addition, fee structures
that penalise managers from deviating from a pre-set risk level can be put in place.
1.2 Definitions
The different terms that we shall use in this dissertation are briefly explained below.
1. Ex-ante: It refers to, before the event. Ex-ante results are forecasts rather
than actual results. Therefore in this research ex-ante performance fees are
forecast based on historical data.
2. Relative Benchmark: This is the pre-set target that is used to measure out-
performance. A good benchmark should show the most important risk and
return drivers of the underlying fund, and it should be a tradable asset like an
index such as the JSE All Share Index (Treasury, 2013).
3. Hurdle Rate: This is the return in excess of outperformance that needs to be
achieved before performance fees accrue. Therefore a manager should beat a
particular relative benchmark by a certain percentage, where the percentage
above the benchmark reflects the hurdle rate. Most funds in our sample have
a hurdle rate and we treat it as a strike rate K in our calculations.
4. High-Water Mark: A high-water mark is the highest value a fund reached in the
previous periods. Funds with high-water marks should recover all benchmark-
relative underperformance losses before they start charging performance fees
(Whitelaw and O’Donnell, 2011). Hence in this dissertation, our fee structures
have high-water mark constraints.
5. Participation Rate: This is the portion of excess return that managers get as
performance fees. Therefore managers do not get the entire excess return as
performance fees, but just a fraction of the excess return.
6. Crystallization Period: This is the interval in which performance fees is paid.
We use a one year crystallization period because this is minimum interval in
which genuine outperformance can be measured.
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7. Capped Fee: This is the maximum fee that managers can charge. Therefore
fee structures with caps prevent fund managers from charging performance
fees above this pre-set cap.
8. Performance Fee Structure: Refers to the way in which expected performance
fees are calculated, i.e., the fund’s relative benchmark, its’ participation rate,
whether it has any high-water mark constraints or any caps and whether it
has a hurdle rate.
9. NAV : The net asset value (NAV ) per share is the traded price of the fund.
10. AUM : Refers to assets under management. AUM is equal to the NAV of the
fund at time zero.
11. Monte Carlo simulation: It involves simulating random paths of a stochastic
process used to describe the evolution of the underlying asset (i.e., randomly
sampling changes in market variables). This kind of pricing is possible since
derivatives can be valued by computing the expectation of the payoff as an
integral (Glasserman, 2013).
1.3 Performance Fee Estimation using Spread Options
Past research papers by Drago, Lazzari and Navone (2008) and Pohjanpalo (2013)
have used spread options to come up with an ex-ante estimate for performance fees.
We discuss the contribution of these research papers in Chapter 3.
We shall use spread options in this dissertation because we are estimating the
fee as an option on the difference between two underlying asset portfolios (i.e., the
fund portfolio and the benchmark portfolio) at some time t, which is the definition
of a spread option. The replicating portfolio technique of derivative pricing (Hull,
2006) does not work in this context since replication is not possible given that the
underlying cannot be hedged. Therefore using option pricing is just a means of ap-
proximation, and it is one we accept because it is a well-developed method (consider
the large literature following Black and Scholes (1973)) of pricing obligations of the
kind we are interested in (the maximum of zero and the difference between fund and
benchmark portfolios). We shall use spread options to estimate the value of perfor-
mance fees under the risk-neutral world where the underlying fund and benchmark
growth at a risk-neutral rate r and we also consider the value of performance under
the real world measure, where the underlying fund and benchmark grow at a drift
rate µ. We estimate the drift rate µ using a formula suggested in a research paper
by Brewer, Feng and Kwan (2012).
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Since spread options have a positive Vega, an increase in volatility increases the
value of performance fees.
Spread Option Formula Parameters
There are a number of parameters that are useful in the spread option formula
and these parameters also affect the value of the option or the value of expected
performance fees.
1. Correlation: The extent to which the fund and benchmark returns fluctuate
together. A positive low correlation between the fund and benchmark gives
rise to a high expected performance fee value and a high positive correlation
in-turn gives rise to a low expected performance fee value.
2. Historical Volatility (“volatility”): The volatility input into an option pricing
model is a measure of expected fluctuations of the underlying over a given
period. It is estimated as the standard deviation of fund and benchmark
returns respectively. High volatilities give rise to high expected performance
fees.
3. Spread Volatility: This is the standard deviation of the difference between
fund and benchmark prices, (i.e., on the monthly fund and benchmark price
differences over 5 years for example). It measures how closely a fund portfolio
mimics its relative benchmark portfolio.
4. Risk-free Rate: The growth rate of assets under the risk-neutral measure Q.
We use The Johannesburg Interbank Average Rate (“jibar”) as a proxy for the
risk-free rate (jibar is a short-term average interest rate, which banks use in
the interbank market to buy and sell their Negotiable Certificate of Deposits).
Jibar can be used as a short term risk-free rate in South Africa (Oosthuizen
and Van Rooyen, 2013). Therefore, since our option term is one year (i.e.,
short dated), we used jibar as a proxy for the risk-free rate.
5. Drift rate: The growth rate µ of assets under the real world measure P. We
shall estimate µ using a formula proposed in a research paper by Brewer, Feng
and Kwan (2012).
6. Strike Rate: This is the hurdle rate, i.e., the return in excess of outperformance
that needs to be achieved before performance fees accrue. We shall denote the
strike rate by K.
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1.4 Dissertation Structure
This dissertation is structured as follows: Chapter 2 outlines the objectives of this
dissertation and the research question we want to answer. In the same chapter, we
briefly discuss the method used to estimate performance fees and the assumptions
we make.
In Chapter 3 we look at past research papers that have used spread options to
calculate ex-ante performance fees. Chapter 3 also outlines different performance
fee structures we shall consider in this dissertation in more detail. In this Chapter
we shall provide information on how we create a performance fee model and the
assumptions we make.
Chapter 4 illustrates how expected performance fees are evaluated or calculated.
In this chapter we provide the different methods we shall use to estimate the numer-
ical value of expected performance fees. We shall utilise; 1. the price of an exchange
option for cases where the strike rate is equal to zero 2. Monte Carlo simulation
for cases where the strike rate is greater than zero and 3. The spread option ap-
proximation formula proposed in a book by Haug (2007) and in a research paper by
Alexander and Venkatramanan (2007) for cases where the strike rate is greater than
zero. We shall look into the usefulness of the approximation formula, as its ease
of calculation compared to Monte Carlo simulation, might be useful to interested
parties like investment managers and potential clients. Lastly, we show how spread
option parameters are estimated.
In Chapter 5 we analyse in detail the expected performance fees results we obtain
under different performance fee structures.




In 2013, National Treasury released a discussion paper on charges in South African
retirement funds (Treasury, 2013). In this discussion paper the question of per-
formance fees and their appropriateness arose. The aim of this dissertation is to
investigate the various performance fee mechanisms generally used in the South
African investment management industry and to determine whether spread option
pricing theory can be used to determine on an ex-ante basis the estimated value
of the performance fee structures. If these valuation techniques are found to be
appropriate, they could be useful in evaluating performance fee structures in the
investment industry. A key output of the project is the determination of the ex-ante
value of performance fee structures under the various historical market scenarios.
2.1.1 Research Questions
The research objective above can be summarised into four key questions, which are
listed below;
1. What is the value of expected performance fees, when a plain fee structure is
used. A plain performance fee structure is where expected performance fees
are estimated simply as the difference between fund and benchmark returns.
We would expect this fee structure to give the highest expected performance
fee out of the four performance fee structures.
2. What is the value of expected performance fees when a fee structure with a
strike rate K (hurdle rate) is used. Expected performance fees are estimated
as the difference between fund and benchmark returns, minus a strike rate K.
Expected performance in this instance will therefore be lower than in 1. above.
3. What is the value of expected performance fees when a fee structure with high-
water mark constraints is used. Expected performance fees are estimated as
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the difference between fund and benchmark returns minus a hurdle rate and a
high-water mark constraint. We expect these high-water constraints to lower
expected performance fees since managers have to recoup any trading period
losses they previously incurred, before they get the incentive fee.
4. Lastly, we shall consider the value of expected performance fees with a capped
fee structure. We expect the distribution of performance fees at T to be
bimodal because performance fees will be equal to zero or the cap, most of the
time.
We shall provide detailed information on performance fee structures in Chapter
3.2 and give equations for each performance fee structure. Expected performance
fees shall be estimated in two ways:
• When the underlying price grows at the risk-neutral rate r.
• When the underlying price grows at the drift rate µ.
We do this to determine how expected performance fee estimates generated by the
two methods compare to the actual performance fees paid. We expect incentive fees
generated using an underlying the grows at µ, to have expected performance fee




Past research on ex-ante evaluation of performance fees has been done using spread
options. A spread option can be defined as an option written on the difference of
the two underlying assets, whose values at time t we denote by S1t and S
2
t (Hurd
and Zhou, 2010). Spread options are normally used in markets where traders wish
to isolate basis risk (Carmona and Durrleman, 2003). Spread options are useful in
our research because their payoff is similar to that used in calculating performance
fees.
We looked at a number of past research papers, focusing on the problem, method
used and the result obtained in each paper in order to understand how performance
fees have been modelled thus far. Below we discuss the contribution of each paper
in detail and the fee structure used.
Drago, Lazzari and Navone (2008) use mutual funds and benchmark returns
data obtained from Datastream for their analysis. They evaluated the ex-ante cost
of performance fees using spread options adapting the payoff to a huge variety of
fee structures. When the strike price in the spread option is set to zero, it becomes
an exchange option which has a closed form solution, i.e., the Margrabe formula
(Margrabe, 1978). Their value then reduces to a function of the tracking error
(which is the volatility of the difference between the fund and the benchmark returns
data), since the strike price is no longer an input because it’s zero. Drago, Lazzari
and Navone (2008) evaluate the ex-ante cost of different compensation schemes as
the premium of a spread option on the active return of the fund. In the Italian
market, investment companies can adopt either a fulcrum (symmetric) or a bonus
(asymmetric) fee structure. They investigate the rationale of bonus incentive fee
structures in the Italian market, which has the following payoff
Payoff = Max(S1T − S2T −K, 0), (3.1)
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where S1T and S
2
T are the fund and benchmark prices respectively.
They used the above formula to evaluate performance fees and found evidence
that this fee structure (which comprises of the participation rate, strike price and
benchmark) gives rise to high investment fees which are difficult to forecast without
a proper technique. The results obtained suggest that this ex-ante value is sensitive
to market conditions. They discover that there is lack of transparency on the cost
of the incentive fee since the investors are giving a free call option (on the difference
between the benchmark and fund return) to the fund manager without receiving a
premium for it. This paper suggests the use of the ex-ante performance fee estimates
as part of the information given to investors and such forecasted fees should be part
of a fund’s performance evaluation.
The rationale behind why and how performance fees are charged is investigated
by Drago, Lazzari and Navone (2010). They use a logistic regression model to de-
termine significant factors that give rise to a firm charging performance fees. The
presence of performance fees is modelled as the dependent variable, which takes the
value one if the fund charges performance fees, and zero otherwise. Various explana-
tory variables are used, for example, the size of the investment firm or whether the
fund is a hybrid fund.
Drago, Lazzari and Navone (2010) investigate the possibility of fund managers
taking excessive risks to increase returns, since the asymmetric fee structure used in
Italy gives an option-like payoff. Their results show that this is false, because such
positions can result in great losses which are not good for the fund’s reputation.
This can lead to the fund losing clients and thereby causing a reduction in assets
under management. They also discover that performance fees are not used by good
managers as a signal to separate themselves from bad managers.
Pohjanpalo (2013) looks at the structure of performance fees in Finnish mutual
funds. He exposes the impact of performance fees on the portfolio risk-return profile
and on obtaining a theoretical value for performance fees. It highlights different
approaches of performance fee estimation and different regulatory approaches in
selected European countries. There is evidence to suggest that funds that charge
performance fees have a better risk-return profile than funds which charge only
management fees. His findings show that funds that charge performance fees are as
risky as funds that do not charge performance fees. Funds that charge performance
fees have a higher tracking error than funds that do not charge performance fees,
which shows that such funds take more active risk. Their results suggest that funds
that charge performance fees have a lower management fee, at the same time extra
costs associated with the incentive fees makes these funds more expensive on an
annual basis. The theoretical ex-ante performance average estimate was 1.35% per
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annum of assets under management at the beginning of a calculation period. This
estimate they obtained was highly sensitive to key parameters such as volatility and
correlation.
This dissertation seeks to calculate an ex-ante performance fee value for South
African mutual funds. The next section looks at different types of performance fee
structures we consider.
3.2 Performance Fee Structures
A performance fee structure is made up of the following elements:
• The relative benchmark of the fund in question.
• A participation rate.
• High-Water mark constraints, if the fee structure has any high-water con-
straints.
• A hurdle rate, if part of the fund’s fee structure.
• A performance fee cap, if the fee structure has a cap.
We shall also assume the following in our calculations:
1. The payment period equals the crystallization period and performance fees are
paid at the end of the period.
2. The crystallization period is a year.
3. There are no purchases or sales of shares before the end of the crystallization
period. All subscriptions and redemptions are done at the beginning or end of
the crystallization period.
4. We shall do all calculations using NAV per share, i.e., as if there was one
investor in the fund. This is done to simplify expected performance fee calcu-
lations.
3.2.1 Plain Vanilla Payoff
The total compensation payable to a fund manager charging both management and
performance fees is
TC = [b0 + b1max(RF −RB, 0)]×AUM , (3.2)
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where b0 is the management fee, b1 is the participation rate (a fraction of the full
excess return that the manager gets), RF is the fund return, RB is the benchmark
return and AUM is assets under management.
Since we do not have a strike rateK, our payoff becomes the payoff of an exchange
option, with a long position in the fund and a short position in the benchmark.
3.2.2 Payoff with a Hurdle Rate
The total compensation payable to a manager with a performance fee structure that
has a hurdle rate is
TC = [b0 + b1max(RF −RB −K, 0)]×AUM , (3.3)
where K is the hurdle rate.
K represents the minimum excess return above the relative benchmark that
needs to be achieved before performance fees accrue.
3.2.3 Payoff with a High-Water Mark
An additional constraint to the payoff with a hurdle rate above, is a high-water mark
TC =
[
b0 + b1I{NAV Fund>NAVHWM}max(RF −RB −K, 0)
]
×AUM , (3.4)
where I is an indicator function that takes 1 if NAV Fund > NAV HWM at time T and
takes the value 0 otherwise.
Therefore managers only get a performance fee if the value of the fund at T is
above the maximum historical value of the fund over a particular measurement pe-
riod. Managers must therefore recoup any trading period losses before performance
fees start accruing. Example, for a one year performance fee, the historical maxi-
mum will be observed over a one year period. Figure 3.1 illustrates the high-water
mark scenario as in a paper by Pohjanpalo (2013).
We observe from Figure 3.1 that fund managers can only charge performance fees
in the fourth quarter when the NAV per share of the fund is above the high-water
mark.
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Fig. 3.1: High-Water Mark: The vertical axis is the NAV of the fund and the
horizontal axis represents time in years.
3.2.4 Payoff with Performance Fee Caps
In this section we consider a capped performance fee payoff. If the excess return
scaled by a participation rate is above the cap, performance fees will be equal to the
cap. The total compensation payable to a fund manager with a capped performance
fee structure is
TC = [b0 + b1min (max(RF −RB −K, 0), c)]×AUM , (3.5)
where c is the cap.
3.3 Modelling the Fee Structure
Spread options are suitable for modelling fee structures in Section 3.2 because the
payoffs are basically evaluating the positive part of the spread between the fund
and benchmark portfolio which is the definition of a spread option (Carmona and
Durrleman, 2003). Since the payoffs in Section 3.2 can be written in terms of fund
and benchmark prices we have













max(SFT − SBT −KS0, 0),
(3.6)
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where SFT and S
B
T are the fund and benchmark prices at T (i.e., the NAV per share
of the fund and benchmark). S0 is the initial price of the fund and benchmark
observed at time 0. This initial price is the same for both the fund and benchmark
since we want to capture relative performance.
The returns R are over the period [0, T ]. We model the fund and benchmark
prices using geometric Brownian motion (GBM), described below.
3.3.1 Model Assumptions
When pricing with the Margrabe Formula, Monte Carlo simulation and the spread
option approximation formula we consider the Black-Scholes-Merton framework and
the usual conditions for Equivalent Martingale Pricing Theory (Zhang, 1997). The
evolution of the fund and benchmark prices under the real-world measure P may be




















where µF and µB are the drifts, i.e., return of the fund and benchmark respectively,
WFt and W
B
t are independent Brownian motions and ρ is the correlation between
the fund and benchmark.
The drift and volatility parameters are assumed to be constant.
Using Girsanov’s theorem, the price processes of the underlying assets satisfy




















where W̃Ft and W̃
B
t are Brownian motions under Q and r is the risk free rate.
We use jibar taken at a specific point in time as r (i.e., as a proxy of the risk-free
rate).
Chapter 4
Evaluation of Performance Fees
We use the SDEs in the previous chapter to get formulas for generating performance
fee values. If the strike price is greater than zero then a closed form solution does
not exist, therefore Monte Carlo simulation and the spread option approximation
formula is used to value the option. When the strike price is equal to zero, the spread
option becomes an exchange option, which has a closed form solution (Margrabe,
1978). When we incorporate high-water marks, closed form solutions are not possible
to obtain (Drago, Lazzari and Navone, 2008) therefore numerical method techniques
like Monte Carlo simulation can be utilised.
4.1 Closed Form Solutions K = 0
Performance fee structures in Chapter 3 can be viewed as a long position in the fund
portfolio and a short position in the benchmark portfolio. We utilise Equation 3.6
to estimate performance fees. Since we want to capture relative performance, the
price of the benchmark and fund at the beginning of the period are set to be equal,
SF0 = S
B
0 = S0. The strike price K = 0 therefore, we utilise the Margrabe Formula




max(SFT − SBT , 0). (4.1)
Therefore the price of the option at time zero V (SF0 , S
B
0 , σ) is given by
V (SF0 , S
B





























Since we use gross returns data which includes dividends, we do not adjust for
dividends in our calculations. Since SF0 = S
B
0 = S0, the log part of Equation 4.3














V (σ) = N(d1)−N(d2). (4.5)
We calculate an estimate for expected performance fees using the above formula
V (σ). The next sections show how expected performance fee values are calculated,
in cases where the fee structure has a strike rate greater than zero K > 0.
4.2 The Spread Option Approximation Formula when
K > 0
We consider the spread option approximation formula proposed by Kirk (1996) and
presented in a paper by Alexander and Venkatramanan (2007). Spread option ap-
proximations are a better and simpler way of estimating fees than Monte Carlo
simulation. We shall test whether the formula works well with our dataset. Since
we want to capture relative performance, the price of the benchmark and fund at
the beginning of the period are set to be equal, SF0 = S
B
0 = S. The payoff of the
option at time T is given by











The approximate value of the option at time zero V (SF0 , S
B
0 , σ,K) is given by
V (SF0 , S
B
0 , σ,K) ≈
(
SB0 +Ke
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r̃ = rF ∗.
K is the strike price, σF and σB are the volatilities of the fund and the benchmark
respectively, ρ is the correlation between the fund and the benchmark, T is the time
to expiration and σ is the spread volatility.
4.3 Monte Carlo Simulation K > 0
In addition to the approximation formula in Section 4.2, Monte Carlo simulation
methods can be used to price a spread option with strike rate greater than zero
(K > 0). Monte Carlo simulation methods are known for their slowness but vari-
ance reduction techniques can be used to mitigate this problem and to improve the
accuracy of Monte Carlo simulation estimates.
We utilise the equations below, as given by Glasserman (2013) to simulate price

















where SFt and S
B
t are the prices of the fund and benchmark portfolios respectively,
r is the risk-free rate, σF and σB are the volatilities of the fund and benchmark
portfolios respectively, XF andXB are standard normal random numbers, correlated
with the Cholesky decomposition and T is the length of time between time nodes,
which can be 1/12 for monthly performance fees and 1 for annual performance fees.
Using Martingale pricing theory, the spread option price (performance fee) is
given by the expected discounted payoff:
V (SF0 , S
B
0 , r, σF , σB, T,K)
= e−rTEQ [H(T )|Ft]
= e−rTEQ
[(


















where EQ is the expectation under the risk-neutral world Q, Ft is the filtration, i.e.,
the history of the fund and benchmark prices up until time t and H(T ) is the spread
option payoff.
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4.3.1 Law of Large Numbers
For completeness we shall provide some results from probability theory. The law
of large numbers (LLNs) shows the results of doing the same experiment a number


















We can estimate the expectation fairly accurately by the sample mean, if we insure
that n is big enough. We shall simulate a large number of fund and benchmark price
paths in order to calculate the spread option payoff and then take the sample mean
of the payoff to estimate the expectation in Equation 4.12. Lastly we then discount
this expected payoff to get the option price (expected performance fees).
4.4 Estimation of Parameters
Our dataset is made up of monthly gross fund and benchmark returns from 31
December 1999 to 31 October 2014. Our sample contains funds which use numbers
as names, for example, fund 102, fund 106 or fund 1102. The benchmarks in our
sample include the All Share Index (ALSI), All Bond Index (ALBI), Shareholder
Weighted Index (SWIX), Short-term Fixed Interest Index (SteFi) and a combination
of indices.
The parameters our model uses as mentioned in Chapter 1 include, fund and
benchmark volatility, correlation between the fund and the benchmark, and the
spread volatility.
4.4.1 Volatility
Fund and Benchmark Volatility
The volatility of the fund and benchmark are estimated simply as the standard
deviation of the fund and benchmark returns respectively. Since we are concerned
with a one year expected performance fee, we have to convert monthly returns in
our data sample to annual returns:
RA = (1 +R1)(1 +R2)(1 +R3)(1 +R4)......(1 +R12)− 1.
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where RA, is the annual return and R1...R12, are the monthly returns, from the first
month to the twelfth month respectively.
We then use these annual returns to calculate the annual volatilities. Firstly, the
sample period spanning from 31 December 1999-31 December 2000 is used as the
in-sample period to calculate the standard deviation of the fund and benchmark.
Then we use different in-sample periods on a monthly and yearly rolling window
basis.
Spread Volatility
The spread volatility measures how closely the fund portfolio mimics its benchmark.
If a fund manager deviates more from the benchmark, i.e., takes more active risk,
spread volatility widens. Pohjanpalo (2013) finds evidence that funds which offer
performance fees are more inclined to take more active risk when the fund is under-
performing to get back in-the-money, i.e., start outperforming again. We calculate
the spread volatility as the standard deviation of the difference in fund and bench-




(xt − x̄)2. (4.13)
where n is the sample size , i.e., the length of the fund and benchmark returns
vector, xt represents the active return, which is the difference between the fund and
benchmark annualised returns and x̄ is the mean of the active return.
4.4.2 Correlation
Correlation measures the extent to which the fund and benchmark portfolio fluctuate
together. We will observe in our computation of performance fees that a positive
low correlation between the fund and benchmark gives rise to high performance fees.
A positive low correlation can be as a result of managers taking more active risk,
i.e., deviating more from the benchmark in anticipation of higher returns. We use
the standard correlation formula (Cohen, Cohen, West and Aiken, 2013) to estimate
the correlation between the fund and benchmark returns.
4.4.3 Drift Rate µ
In this Subsection we consider the procedure we are going to use to estimate the
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where µ̂ is the drift rate estimate, i.e., the expected return (annualised) earned by
an investor over a short period of time ∆t, ST is the stock price at terminal time T ,
S0 is the stock price at the beginning of the period and σ is the standard deviation
of the Fund and Benchmark returns, respectively.
4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
We shall introduce a short sensitivity analysis section. We follow the method in a
paper by Pohjanpalo (2013), where the author calculated sensitivities with respect
to volatility and correlation between the fund and benchmark portfolio. We shall
also calculate the sensitivity of performance fees to changes in the strike price and
risk metrics in this dissertation, which are not included in our reference research
paper. This sensitivity analysis section will assist interested parties to have an idea
on how expected performance fee estimates change as these parameters fluctuate.
4.5.1 Sensitivity with Respect to Strike
In this section we analyse how sensitive ex-ante performance fee values are to changes
in the strike price K. We derive the sensitivity using a Monte Carlo simulation
backward-difference approximation (Glasserman, 2013).
The purpose of carrying out such analysis is to help potential clients to make
better decisions on which fee structure to choose, from a pool of fee structures, (i.e.,
strike price, participation rate, benchmark and high-water marks).
Chapter 5
Ex-ante Cost of Performance
Fees in South Africa
In this chapter, we consider the numerical values of expected performance fees under
different fee structures. To recap the calculation procedure; we utilise the methods in
Chapter 4, to estimate ex-ante performance fee values depending on the fee structure
of the fund. Our sample consist of 76 mutual funds, with some funds having data
over the whole time span and other funds with data over shorter time periods. The
word mean in the tables that follow in this chapter, is just an average figure across
a particular asset class. All funds in our sample use stock market, money market
and bond market indices or a combination of indices as relative benchmarks.
We shall categorise our results based on the four performance fee structures we
consider in this dissertation. Since we are estimating ex-ante performance fees, i.e.,
performance fees that will be paid at a future date, we do not know the actual
performance fees paid at that future time. Therefore we only compare the actual
historical performance fees paid with respective ex-ante performance fees in the ap-
pendices. We do this to see how well the spread option model has estimated the
actual performance fees paid in the past. Figure 5.1 shows the average volatility of
funds relative to their respective benchmarks for bonds (ALBI), equity (ALSI) and
money market funds (SteFi).
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Fig. 5.1: Average Volatility of Equity Funds Relative to ALSI Benchmark.
Fig. 5.2: Average Volatility of Fixed Income Funds Relative to ALBI Benchmark.
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Fig. 5.3: Average Volatility of Money Market Funds Relative to SteFi Benchmark.
We can observe from Figure 5.1 that fund managers try to match the risk pro-
file of their respective benchmarks and they always keep the volatility of the fund
below that of the benchmark. Although fund portfolios and their respective bench-
mark portfolios are highly correlated, the weighting of holdings in the portfolios are
different, which gives rise to the difference between the fund and benchmark port-
folio volatilities we observe in Figure 5.1. We can observe that fixed income funds
have a risk profile that closely matches that of its benchmark. Equity funds have
the highest volatility as expected, with the fund portfolio being less volatile than its
benchmark portfolio mainly because of the weightings of the holdings in the port-
folio and how diversified it is. Money market funds exhibit the lowest volatilities of
the three asset classes as expected, mainly because they are held over a short time
horizon, i.e., less than a year. The huge difference between the fund and benchmark
in the lower end of the money market graphs, may be as a result of a low sample
size. We can observe that the graph become more stable as the number of years
increase and in-turn as the sample size increases.
5.1 Numerical Value of Performance Fees
In the subsections that follow we look at the value of ex-ante performance fees
calculated using spread options. We shall analyse ex-ante performance fees obtained
using closed form solutions, the spread option approximation formula and using
Monte Carlo simulation. Under Monte Carlo simulation, various variance reduction
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techniques such as Control Variates and Antithetic Monte Carlo simulation shall
be utilised in order to improve the accuracy of expected performance fees generated
using Monte Carlo simulation (Glasserman, 2013). We perform 100 000 Monte Carlo
simulations to estimate expected performance fees in each of the sections that follow.
In each section we shall consider performance fees calculated when the price process
is driven by r, the risk-free rate and when its driven by a drift rate µ.
5.1.1 Distribution of Performance Fees at T
In this subsection we show the distribution of performance fees at T , i.e., perfor-
mance fees generated by the payoff function.
We sampled from the returns data and randomly extracted a Fund and Bench-
mark return twelve times to generate monthly prices of the fund and benchmark
respectively. From these monthly prices we then calculated performance fees and
drew a histogram of the payoff.
One of the reasons we do this, is to illustrate that an expected value we intend
to estimate, might not accurately approximate the value of performance fees.
Fig. 5.4: Distribution of Performance Fees.
We can observe that most of the time performance fees are zero, since there is a lot
of mass at zero. We can also observe from the graphs that the distribution of perfor-
mance fees is positively skewed as expected because of the maximum function in our
payoff. An expected value for performance fees will therefore lie somewhere in the
distribution above, for a performance fee structure with a strike rate. In Figure 5.5,
we show the distribution of performance fees for a performance fee payoff with a cap.
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Fig. 5.5: Distribution of Capped Performance Fees.
The distribution of capped performance fees is bimodal, therefore most of the time
performance fees are either zero or one. The expected performance fee value will
likely be either zero or one, since there is a lot of mass at zero and at one.
5.1.2 Plain Vanilla Ex-ante Performance Fees
We first consider a simple payoff, where expected performance fees are calculated
as the difference between the fund and benchmark portfolio. The payoff is that of
an exchange option with a closed form solution, the Margrabe formula (Margrabe,
1978). Expected performance fees are calculated over a 1 year period, using Equa-
tion 4.5. Our dataset stretches from 31 December 1999 to 31 October 2014. We
calculate the fee fourteen times. Parameters such as correlation and volatility are es-
timated using an in-sample period of the most recent observations of historical data.
Table 5.1 shows the average cost of performances fees across different asset classes.
We use the whole sample space to estimate parameters and we use an arbitrary
participation rate of 15%. We calculate expected performance fees as at 31 October
2015. Since we are calculating an expected performance fee value to be paid in the
future, i.e., at 31 October 2015, we cannot compare it to an actual performance fee
value since the fee has not been paid as yet.
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Tab. 5.1: Plain Vanilla Performance Fees in Percentage.
Number-of-
Funds
Mean 1 Min 2 Max
Equity 36 0.3358 % 0 % 0.8038 %
Fixed Income 22 0.0868 % 0 % 0.3733 %
Money Market 18 0.0177 % 0 % 0.0605 %
1 Mean performance fees are just an average figure across all equity, bonds and
money market funds in our sample.
2 The minimum performance fee is zero as expected. This is because our formula
has a maximum function and takes zero if the difference between the fund and
benchmark is negative.
Tab. 5.2: Plain Vanilla Performance Fees in Basis Points.
Number-of-
Funds
Mean 1 Min 2 Max
Equity 36 33.58 Bps 0 Bps 80.38 Bps
Fixed Income 22 8.68 Bps 0 Bps 37.33 Bps
Money Market 18 1.77 Bps 0 Bps 6.05 Bps
As expected the mean expected performance fees for equity is higher than that of
bonds and money market funds in Table 5.1 and Table 5.2. This is as a result of high
volatilities in equity funds, which in turn produce high performance fee estimates.
Money market instruments are investments for less than 12 months, therefore
they have low volatility and as a result we expect them to have low performance fee
estimates as listed in the Table 5.1 and Table 5.2.
5.1.3 Ex-ante Performance Fees with a Hurdle Rate
In this subsection we consider what the ex-ante fees are when the fee structure
contains a hurdle rate K. Like in the previous subsection, we use the whole sample
size as the in-sample period, an arbitrary participation rate of 15%, an arbitrary
strike rate of 1% and performance fees are calculated as at 31 October 2015. As
expected these performance fee estimates are lower than those in Table 5.1, which
have no hurdle rates. In the tables that follow, we shall consider what expected
performance fees are when the price process is driven by risk-free rate r and when
the price process is driven by µ the drift rate.
In Table 5.3 MC stands for Monte Carlo simulation and in this table we consider
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performance fees generated using the spread approximation formula, Monte Carlo
simulation, Antithetic Monte Carlo simulation and Control Variates. We use these
variance reduction techniques to improve Monte Carlo simulation estimates for ex-
pected performance fees.
Tab. 5.3: Performance Fees with Hurdle Rates. Prices are generated using








Equity 0.2968 % 0.2758 % 0.2959 % 0.2960 %
Fixed Income 0.0470 % 0.0425 % 0.0456 % 0.0457 %
Money Market 0.0011 % 0.0009 % 0.00094 % 0.00095 %
1 We can observe that the variance reduction techniques have better performance
fee estimates that are close to the approximation formula results. This shows that
these variance reduction methods improve the accuracy of performance fee estimates
in cases where expected performance fees can only be calculated using Monte Carlo
simulation.
Tab. 5.4: Performance Fees with Hurdle Rates. Prices are generated using
a drift rate µ.
MC 1 MC-(Antithetic)
Equity 0.2555 % 0.2741 %
Fixed Income 0.0381 % 0.0409 %
Money Market 0.00092 % 0.00098 %
1 In cases where the price process is driven by a drift rate µ,
we shall only use Monte Carlo simulation and Antithetic
Monte Carlo simulation.
In Table 5.4, we generate expected performance fees using prices that evolve or are
generated using a drift rate µ. We expect performance fee estimates in Table 5.3,
to relate more to the actual fees paid because they are being modelled under real
world dynamics and risk preferences.
5.1.4 Ex-ante Performance Fees with High-Water Mark (HWM)
In this subsection we consider what the ex-ante fees are when the fee structure con-
tains a high-water mark. When the period-end NAV is lower the HWM (i.e., the
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highest value the NAV has reached in the measurement period), the fund manager
does not get a performance fee. Which means that fund managers must recover all
losses incurred in a particular measurement period, before performance fees start
accruing. Therefore if managers do not recover all their losses, ex-ante performance
fees become zero. We expect performance fee structures with high-water marks, to
have lower expected performance fees than those of the other two fee structures we
have discussed earlier. We use the whole sample size as the in-sample period, an
arbitrary participation rate of 15%, an arbitrary strike rate of 1% and performance
fees are calculated as at 31 October 2015.
Tab. 5.5: Performance Fees with HWMs.
Number-of-
Funds
Mean 1 Min Max
Equity 36 0.2084 % 0 % 0.7215 %
Fixed Income 22 0.0396 % 0 % 0.2740 %
Money Market 18 0.001 % 0 % 0.00501 %
1 Mean performance fees are just an average figure across all equity, bonds and money
market funds in our sample.
As expected, performance fee estimates in Table 5.5 are the lowest of all the per-
formance structures we have discussed so far. We are of the opinion that, such
performance fee structures are fair since managers do not get compensated when
they perform badly in a particular measurement period. Some research papers have
looked at the rationale of using such fee structures (Ruckes and Sevostiyanova, 2011).
Lastly we consider the values of expected performance fees when the fee structure
has a cap of 1%.
5.1.5 Ex-ante Performance Fees with a Capped Payoff
In this subsection we consider a performance fee structure that caps expected perfor-
mance fees at 1%, i.e., the maximum performance fee that a manager can get. Such
structures can prevent managers from taking unnecessary active risk, in pursuit of
higher expected performance fees, since performance fees above 1% are reduced to
a cap of 1%. The distribution of capped performance fees is bimodal as displayed in
Figure 5.6, since performance fees will either be zero or one most of the times. The
graph in Figure 5.6, is the payoff of a single equity fund, i.e., Specialist Domestic
Equity Fund 102.
In Table 5.6, we show expected performance fee values that have a capped perfor-
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Fig. 5.6: Distribution of Capped Performance Fees at time T .
mance fee structure. As expected, these expected performance fees are lower than
those of the fee structures in Subsections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2. We use the whole sample
size as the in-sample period, a participation rate of 15%, a strike rate of 1% and
performance fees are calculated as at 31 October 2015.




Equity 36 0.2782 % 0 % 0.6542 %
Fixed Income 22 0.0441 % 0 % 0.2944 %
Money Market 18 0.001 % 0 % 0.0621 %
Table 5.7, is a summary of all the performance fee structures we have considered in
this section. In this table we display all the mean expected performance fees for all
the four performance fee structures for comparison. These fees have price processes
that are generated using the risk-free rate r. PF is the abbreviation for perfor-
mance fees, thus PF-PlainVanilla is the performance fee structure in Subsection
5.1.1, PF-HurdleRate Subsection 5.1.2 and so on.






Equity 0.3358% 0.2968 % 0.2084 % 0.2782 %
Fixed Income 0.0868 % 0.0470 % 0.0396 % 0.0441 %
Money Market 0.0177 % 0.0011 % 0.001 % 0.001 %
1 We can observe from the Table the effect of performance fee structures on
expected performance fee values.
5.2 Sensitivities 30
5.2 Sensitivities
We conduct sensitivity analysis in order to observe how expected performance fee
estimates change as some key parameters (i.e., correlation, volatility and participa-
tion rate.) change. We shall use the same in-sample period from 31 December 1999
to 31 October 2014, an arbitrary small strike rate of 1% and a participation rate of
15%. Performance fees calculated are payable at a future date, 31 October 2015.
5.2.1 Performance Fees as Correlation and Volatility Change
We first consider how performance fees change as we vary the fund and benchmark
portfolio correlation and volatilities. In Chapter 4.4 we estimated correlation and
volatility but in this section we use arbitrary correlation and volatility values. Table
5.8 shows how ex-ante performance fees change as the correlation and volatility vary.
In Table 5.8, we notice that ex-ante performance fees increase when the correlation
between the fund and benchmark portfolio is low. A positive low correlation implies
that managers are taking more active risk by deviating from the benchmark in
pursuit of higher returns. This in-turn increases the volatility of the payoff.
In Table 5.8, funds that are highly correlated with their respective benchmarks
and also having low volatilities have very low performance fees. Which is the case
with our data sample, hence the low expected performance fees in Section 5.1.
Tab. 5.8: The Effect of Correlation and Volatility on Expected
Performance Fees.
1 5% 10% 15% 18% 20% 22% 25% 30%
0.1 2 0.3741 % 0.9278 % 1.2332 % 1.4905 % 1.7808 % 1.8328% 2.0886 % 2.6289 %
0.2 0.3572 % 0.8724 % 1.1585 % 1.4012 % 1.6760 % 1.7241 % 1.9656 % 2.4766 %
0.3 0.3220 % 0.8136 % 1.0791 % 1.3062 % 1.5644 % 1.6085 % 1.8346 % 2.3141 %
0.4 0.2932 % 0.7507 % 0.9937 % 1.2040 % 1.4445 % 1.4841 % 1.6938 % 2.1392 %
0.5 0.2620 % 0.6826 % 0.9007 % 1.0928 % 1.3144 % 1.3486 % 1.5402 % 1.9489 %
0.6 0.2276 % 0.6078 % 0.7980 % 0.9699 % 1.1706 % 1.1988 % 1.3704 % 1.7380 %
0.7 0.1887 % 0.5237 % 0.6815 % 0.8303 % 1.0077 % 1.0287 % 1.1774 % 1.4986 %
0.8 0.1432 % 0.4261 % 0.5435 % 0.6649 % 0.8153 % 0.8269 % 0.9484 % 1.2146 %
0.9 0.0855 % 0.3045 % 0.3642 % 0.4497 % 0.5680 % 0.5640 % 0.6498 % 0.8458 %
1 On the top horizontal axis, 5%-30% represent fund volatilities.
2 On the extreme left vertical axis, numbers from 0.1-0.9 represent correlation
between the fund and benchmark.
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5.2.2 Dual Delta
We consider the sensitivity of expected performance fees to changes in the strike rate
K, in this subsection. Table 5.9 uses the backward-difference formula to calculate
the sensitivity of the spread option with respect to a 1% change in the strike price
(i.e., the definition for dual delta). There is less chance of the spread option ending in
the money as the strike increases, therefore our dual delta values should be negative.
This means that the spread option values (ex-ante performance fees) decreases as
the strike increases. Just as in previous subsections we categorize our results in
terms of asset class.
Tab. 5.9: Dual Delta as K varies
Equity Money Market Fixed Income
K = 0.04 -0.0461 % 0% -0.003%
K = 0.03 -0.0531 % 0 % -0.0058 %
K = 0.02 -0.0605 % -0.0005 % -0.0143%
K = 0.01 -0.0682 % -0.0260 % -0.0406 %
As the strike increases and the options are pulled further away from the money, there
is a lower (negative) sensitivity to the strike price. The dual delta for the money
market asset class is zero for high strike rates. This implies that as we increase the
strike rate the fee estimate becomes less sensitive to this strike price as we mentioned
above. Equity is more sensitive to movements in the strike rate than the other two
asset classes, as expected.
5.2.3 Performance Fees as Participation Rate Changes
This section investigates how fee estimates change as we vary the participation rate,
(i.e., the fraction of performance fees that the manager gets). We want to observe
whether fee estimates in all of the three asset classes react the same to changes in
the participation rate. We classified our results according to asset class as we did in
other sections. We take the mean across fund in each asset class.
We can observe from Table 5.10 that performance fee estimates for Equity, Fixed
Income (i.e., bonds) and the Money Market Funds are equally affected by changes
in the participation rate. Therefore a 20% increase in the participation rate will also
result in a 20% increase in the ex-ante performance fees.
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Tab. 5.10: Performance Fee Estimates as the Participation Rate
Changes.
1 Equity Fixed Income Money Market
0.1 2 0.1837% 0.0283% 0.0006%
0.15 0.2758% 0.0425% 0.0009%
0.2 0.3678% 0.0568% 0.0012%
1 The table has mean values for Equity, Money Market and Fixed Income
funds.
2 The numbers 0.1-0.2 represent different participation rates being used to
calculate the value of performance fees.
5.2.4 Performance Fees as Spread Volatility and Boundary
Condition Change
In this Subsection we consider the value of performance fees as we alter the spread
volatility between the Fund and Benchmark portfolio. We are also going to examine
how performance fee structures react to changes in the spread volatility. We shall
simulate ex-ante performance fees for every spread volatility level using the spread
option approximation formula. A one year crystallisation period, a participation
rate of 15% and benchmark volatility of 20%, shall be used in calculations.
Tab. 5.11: The Effect of Correlation and Volatility on Expected
Performance Fees.
Spread Volatility 8.9048% 12.5919% 14.9245% 16.3198% 20.5715% 22.8531% 28.5846%
Fund Volatility 20% 20% 22% 22% 25% 25% 30%
Correlation 0.90 0.80 0.75 0.70 0.60 0.50 0.40
Plain Vanilla 0.5743% 0.8119% 0.9604% 1.0503% 1.3218% 1.4685% 1.8330%
Hurdle Rate 0.5072% 0.7440% 0.8938% 0.9834% 1.2562% 1.4024% 1.7688%
Cap at 1% 0.4543% 0.4864% 0.5199% 0.5629% 0.6580% 0.6941% 0.7938%
1 Plain Vanilla as mentioned in Subsection 5.1.1, refers to a payoff without
a Hurdle rate, HWM and Cap.
2 We use arbitrary fund volatilities and correlation coefficients.
In the appendices we look at ex-ante performance fees for each fund in our dataset.
We display the values of ex-ante performance fees when the price process is generated
by a risk-free rate r and when the price process is generated by a drift rate µ. As a




The aim of this dissertation was to estimate performance fees some time before the
fee is paid, in order to have an idea of the value of this fee under different performance
fee structures used in the South African investment industry. Certain parties might
also benefit from having a reasonable estimate of this value.
We calculated these ex-ante performance fee estimates using the Margrabe for-
mula when the strike rate was equal to zero and we utilised the spread option ap-
proximation formula and Monte Carlo simulation when the strike rate was greater
than zero. We utilised variance reduction techniques under Monte Carlo simulation.
These variance reduction techniques increase the accuracy of ex-ante performance
fee estimates.
Ex-ante performance fee estimates we obtained have a positively skewed distri-
bution, mainly because of the maximum function on the payoff. These ex-ante fees
are highly sensitive to the correlation between the fund and benchmark respectively
and to the spread volatility. Which implies that a low positive correlation between
the fund and benchmark gives rise to a high ex-ante performance fee and likewise
high spread volatilities also give rise to high ex-ante performance fees.
We can observe from the tables in the appendix that during the 2007 to 2008
financial market crisis when markets tumbled down increasing the volatility of the
holdings in the fund and benchmark portfolios (i.e., leverage effect). The value
of ex-ante performance fees increased in subsequent years, since we are forecasting
ex-ante performance fees using historical data.
Performance fee structures with high-water marks are more neutral to the in-
vestor since performance fees are only paid after the manager recovers any loss they
incurred. In addition caps help to deter fund managers from taking excess risk
(i.e., increasing the spread volatility in pursuit of higher performance fees), since
the maximum performance fee they can earn is capped.
The sensitivity analysis results suggest that changes in key parameters like the
strike price, correlation and participation rate, do not have the same effect on all
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asset classes, for example equity is more sensitive to movements in the strike than
fixed income and money market instruments.
Our results also suggest that risky funds do not always have the highest perfor-
mance fees. Therefore its only funds with high spread volatilities (volatility of the
difference between the fund and the benchmark returns data), that also exhibit high
performance fee estimates.
Ex-ante performance fees obtained are lower than the actual performance fees
paid. This might mean that fund managers are over charging their clients or spread
option valuation underestimates the value of performance fees. Lastly, we do not do
any analysis on Hedge Funds because we do not have sufficient data in our sample.
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where the Price Process is
Generated by r
Tab. A.1: Change in Performance Fees from one Period to Another for
Equity Funds.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2104
Fund102 - 0.5490 % 0.8594% 0.7577% 0.3351% 0.3216% 0.2039% 0.2764% 0.4146% 0.7327% 0.4273% 0.4209% 0.2031% 0.1442% 0.1976%
Fund1013 - - - - - - 0.3021% 0.2907% 0.2794% 0.3658% 0.1993% 0.2392% 0.0745% 0.0852% 0.0743%
Fund1018 - - - - - 0.0715% 0.1499% 0.1438% 0.0635% 0.2478% 0.0728% 0.0614% 0.0446% 0.1167% 0.2229%
Fund1024 - - - - - 0.6847% 0.4848% 0.4439% 0.5316% 0.7226% 0.5383% 0.1091% 0.1789% 0.1683% 0.3250%
Fund1050 - - - - - - - 0.0789% 0.0666% 0.1522% 0.0426% 0.0941% 0.0419% 0.1115% 0.0478%
Fund1051 - - - - - - - 0.1302% 0.1893% 0.3451% 0.0850% 0.1290% 0.1113% 0.3450% 0.2019%
Fund1052 - - - - - - - - - 0.3819% 0.1179% 0.0183% 0.1216% 0.1345% 0.1841%
Fund1053 - - - - - - - 0.1480% 0.3286% 0.2447% 0.0812% 0.1191% 0.1094% 0.2213% 0.1257%
Fund1054 - - - - - - 0.0758% 0.0057% 0.0265% 0.0904% 0.1369% 0.0405% 0.0657% 0.1160% 0.2199%
Fund1055 - - - - - - - 0.0374% 0.1024% 0.2547% 0.1683% 0.0814% 0.1500% 0.3473% 0.2375%
Fund1059 - - - - - - - - 0.0823% 0.0509% 0.0085% 0.0256% 0.0367% 0.0188% 0.1175%
Fund1060 - - 0.0529% 0.0219% 0.0258% 0% 0% 0% 0.0017% 0.0426% 0.0697% 0% 0.1931% 0.0532% 0.0454%
Fund1063 - - - - - 0.1053% 0.0785% 0.0713% 0.2462% 0.2000% 0.0924% 0.0721% 0.0541% 0.1534% 0.0365%
Fund1072 - - - - - - - - - 0.0509% 0.0877% 0.0297% 0.0424% 0.0965% 0.1819%
Fund1076 - - - - - - - 0.2505% 0.6715% 0.8054% 0.3514% 0.2434% 0.3952% 0.2768% 0.1573%
Fund1077 - - - - - - - - 0.1228% 0.2037% 0.2081% 0.1268% 0.1486% 0.2656% 0.2006%
Fund1078 - - - - - 0.1654% 0.2524% 0.2103% 0.2186% 0.1651% 0.0807% 0.0842% 0.0612% 0.2695% 0.2298%
Fund122 - 0.1539% 0.1689% 0.3074% 0.1935% 0.1546% 0.1821% 0.2410% 0.2183% 0.6284% 0.5253% 0.1655% 0.1373% 0.1438% 0.2116%
Fund234 - 0.2799% 0.1767% 0.2387% 0.1988% 0.1149% 0.1206% 0.0845% 0.0792% 0.2084% 0.2236% 0.0656% 0.0411% 0.0432% 0.1130%
Fund313 - - - 1.2670% 0.6067% 0.3954% 0.2420% 0.1703% 0.2305% 0.5606% 0.3106% 0.0841% 0.1857% 0.0764% 0.1145%
Fund322 - - - 1.1536% 0.3885% 0.4219% 0.2770% 0.2713% 0.1590% 0.6849% 0.7117% 0.4281% 0.1766% 0.3724% 0.3628%
Fund323 - 1.3312% 1.9826% 1.0693% 0.4402% 0.5150% 0.2747% 0.1350% 0.2515% 0.3685% 0.6116% 0.2763% 0.2139% 0.2130% 0.1707%
Fund384 - - 0.9735% 0.8306% 0.5371% 0.3205% 0.2668% 0.1765% 0.2632% 0.4759% 0.6343% 0.3652% 0.3755% 0.2292% 0.1550%
Fund385 - - - 0.0626% 0.2631% 0.1229% 0.0462% 0.0641% 0.0557% 0.2004% 0.1602% 0.0636% 0.0490% 0.1176% 0.1184%
Fund433 - - - - - 0.0846% 0.1957% 0.2056% 0.1505% 0.3886% 0.1718% 0.0659% 0.0561% 0.1995% 0.1960%
Fund434 - - - 0.1394% 0.2989% 0.1428% 0.1942% 0.2191% 0.1250% 0.2666% 0.1491% 0.0331% 0.0414% 0.2054% 0.2029%
Fund435 - - - 0.2414% 0.1280% 0.2242% 0.2253% 0.1791% 0.3525% 0.5944% 0.3739% 0.1994% 0.2823% 0.3284% 0.5460%
Fund439 - - - 0.1483% 0.2839% 0.3213% 0.0726% 0.0953% 0.1230% 0.3205% 0.2571% 0.1817% 0.0590% 0.18% 0.2292%
Fund441 - 0.4605% 0.9547% 0.8357% 0.8147% 0.6095% 0.4503% 0.4894% 0.6160% 1.4880% 0.6133% 0.3223% 0.2707% 0.2980% 0.4635%
Fund444 - 0.3650% 0.8102% 0.4575% 0.3234% 0.3970% 0.2253% 0.2537% 0.2372% 0.5605% 0.4593% 0.2121% 0.1917% 0.1584% 0.0820%
Fund480 - - - 0.0947% 0.4822% 0.1446% 0.1426% 0.1553% 0.0805% 0.1023% 0.0616% 0.0135% 0.02% 0.0445% 0.0343%
Fund652 - - - - 0.3816% 0.5404% 0.6282% 0.3975% 0.9% 0.9787% 0.4569% 0.2616% 0.4212% 0.4256% 0.3909%
Fund694 - - - 0.1230% 0.4562% 0.1824% 0.1218% 0.1645% 0.1034% 0.0775% 0.0360% 0.0309% 0.0479% 0.0528% 0.0642%
Fund696 - 0.6219% 1.0899% 0.5486% 0.6712% 0.5434% 0.5043% 0.2543% 0.6548% 0.5819% 0.3218% 0.1978% 0.22% 0.2689% 0.5001%
Fund760 - - - 0.0756% 0.4771% 0.1208% 0.1495% 0.1112% 0.1695% 0.1842% 0.0693% 0.0710% 0.0606% 0.0432% 0.0842%
Fund911 - - - 0.4210% 0.2102% 0.4138% 0.3307% 0.1818% 0.2233% 0.4131% 0.2487% 0.1928% 0.0691% 0.1843% 0.1262%
1 The symbol ”-”, shows that the Fund did not exist at that point in time.
2 We can observe that ex-ante performance fees increase a bit after the 2007-2008 financial crisis.
Which is plausible since we are using historical data to forecast performance fees. Therefore
high volatilities observed in 2007-2008, are only put into the model as an input in 2008 and 2009.
As expected ex-ante performance fees increase, since spread options have a positive vega.
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Tab. A.2: Change in Performance Fees from one Period to Another for
Fixed Income Funds.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2104
Fund1015 - - - - - - - 0.0026% 0.0014% 0.0042% 0.0123% 0.0517% 0.0134% 0% 0.0150%
Fund1058 - - - - - - - - 0% 0.0081% 0% 0.0003% 0.0015% 0.0065% 0.0072%
Fund107 - 0.0133% 0.0203% 0.0089% 0.01% 0.0167% 0.0554% 0.0167% 0.0034% 0.0162% 0.0017% 0% 0.0032% 0.0001% 0.0007%
Fund1083 - - - - - - - - 0.0876% 0.1149% 0.0007% 0.0001% 0% 0.0024% 0.0431%
Fund1185 - - - - - - - - - 0.0072% 0.0033% 0.0031% 0.0008% 0.0039% 0.0060%
Fund1188 - - - - - - - - 0.1774% 0.5319% 0.1453% 0.3042% 0.2198% 0.2737% 0.1670%
Fund162 - 0.0043% 0.0058% 0.0019% 0% 0.0023% 0.0361% 0.0182% 0.0245% 0.1487% 0.0527% 0.0085% 0.0307% 0.0335% 0.0873%
Fund236 - 0% 0.0005% 0.0005% 0.0007% 0.0003% 0% 0.0003% 0% 0.0063% 0.0094% 0.0009% 0% 0% 0.0002%
Fund2512 - - - - - - 0.0627% 0.0053% 0.0010% 0.0267% 0.0001% 0.0018% 0.0102% 0.0157% 0.0044%
Fund326 - 0.0161% 0.0180% 0.0007% 0.0215% 0.0144% 0.0034% 0.0022% 0.0097% 0.0337% 0.0273% 0.0043% 0.0150% 0.0025% 0.0209%
Fund327 - 0.0228% 0.0545% 0.0306% 0.0015% 0.0032% 0.0145% 0.0070% 0.0337% 0.0212% 0.02% 0.0137% 0.0674% 0.0055% 0.0397%
Fund343 - 0.0003% 0.0001% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0006% 0.0005% 0.0399% 0.0001% 0.0001% 0.0007% 0.0014% 0.0021%
Fund344 - 0.0034% 0.0343% 0.0074% 0.0029% 0.0698% 0.0044% 0.0001% 0.0053% 0.0029% 0.0019% 0.0009% 0.0011% 0.0054% 0.0009%
Fund347 - 0.0225% 0.0960% 0.0179% 0.0030% 0.0058% 0.0003% 0.0004% 0.0135% 0.0062% 0.0001% 0.0018% 0.0001% 0.0001% 0.0016%
Fund373 - - - 0.0109% 0.0012% 0.0035% 0.0099% 0.0011% 0.0021% 0.0038% 0.0165% 0.0096% 0.0683% 0.0083% 0.0509%
Fund375 - 0.0002% 0.0065% 0.0006% 0.0002% 0.0059% 0.0013% 0.0018% 0.0016% 0.0322% 0% 0.0030% 0.0030% 0.0041% 0.0154%
Fund377 - 0% 0.0068% 0.0167% 0.0023% 0% 0.0001% 0% 0% 0.0062% 0.0009% 0.0002% 0.0011% 0.0004% 0.0195%
Fund380 - 0.0001% 0.0145% 0.0092% 0.0069% 0.0065% 0% 0.0017% 0% 0.0196% 0.0003% 0.0008% 0% 0.0005% 0.0043%
Fund381 - 0.0086% 0.0215% 0.0285% 0.0053% 0.0011% 0.0004% 0.0041% 0% 0.0037% 0.0024% 0.0005% 0.0007% 0.0001% 0.0041%
Fund4133 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.2929% 0.2328% 0.2366% 0.4560%
Fund645 - - - 0.0006% 0.0012% 0% 0.0039% 0.0038% 0.1044% 0.0197% 0.015% 0.0360% 0.0018% 0.0031% 0.0220%
Fund768 - - - - - 0.1821% 0.0289% 0.1851% 0.0765% 0.1532% 0.0096% 0.0078% 0.0006% 0.0836% 0.0022%
1 Fixed Income funds have ex-ante performance fee values that are a bit lower than equity funds,
as expected.
Tab. A.3: Change in Performance Fees from one Period to Another for
Money Market Funds.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2104
Fund1033 - - - - - - - 0.0032% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1042 - - - - - - 0% 0.0069% 0.0008% 0.1489% 0.0018% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1049 - - - - - 0.0001% 0% 0% 0% 0.04287% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1056 - - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0002% 0.0015% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund106 - 0.0203% 0.0001% 0% 0.0014% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1102 - 0% 0.0077% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1490 - 0.52% 0.68% 0.83% 1.00% 1.02% 1.17% 1.49% 0.37% 0.92% 1.23% 1.49% 1.78% 1.83% 2.08%
Fund167 - - - - - - - - 0.0038% 0.0066% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund2230 - 0.0219% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0008% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund229 - - - - - - - - 0.0032% 0.0029% 0.0279% 0.0070% 0.0082% 0.0018% 0.0386%
Fund280 - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund282 - - - 0.0032% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.004% 0% 0% 0% 0.0010% 0.0021% 0.0068%
Fund283 - 0.0091% 0% 0.0009% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0010% 0.006% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0006%
Fund285 - 0.0054% 0% 0.0065% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0002% 0% 0% 0% 0.0011% 0%
Fund341 - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0042%
Fund490 - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0074%
Fund589 - 0% 0.0089% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund71 - 0.0152% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
1 We can observe that Money Market funds have very low performance fees since they also
have very low volatilities.
Appendix B
Ex-ante Performance Fees,
where the Price Process is
Generated by a drift rate µ
Tab. B.1: Change in Performance Fees from one Period to Another for
Equity Funds.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2104
Fund102 - 0.5608% 0.6917% 0.8411% 0.3005% 0.3167% 0.2382% 0.3070% 0.3935% 0.6810% 0.3348% 0.3356% 0.1928% 0.0966% 0.1833%
Fund1013 - - - - - - 0.2925% 0.3180% 0.2261% 0.3115% 0.1788% 0.1749% 0.0620% 0.0738% 0.0990%
Fund1018 - - - - - 0.0693% 0.1238% 0.1507% 0.0608% 0.2385% 0.0870% 0.0738% 0.0421% 0.1244% 0.2591%
Fund1024 - - - - - 0.7872% 0.4773% 0.4575% 0.4829% 0.5723% 0.4813% 0.0911% 0.1699% 0.1615% 0.2679%
Fund1050 - - - - - - - 0.0715% 0.0645% 0.1383% 0.0321% 0.0907% 0.0312% 0.1156% 0.0573%
Fund1051 - - - - - - - 0.1357% 0.1673% 0.4425% 0.0704% 0.1037% 0.0697% 0.3569% 0.1781%
Fund1052 - - - - - - - - - 0.3141% 0.1235% 0.0083% 0.0933% 0.1009% 0.1728%
Fund1053 - - - - - - - 0.1336% 0.2842% 0.2582% 0.0650% 0.0948% 0.07% 0.2127% 0.1035%
Fund1054 - - - - - - 0.0720% 0.0051% 0.0275% 0.0803% 0.1490% 0.0325% 0.0593% 0.0961% 0.2555%
Fund1055 - - - - - - - 0.0411% 0.0982% 0.2712% 0.1468% 0.0773% 0.1139% 0.3692% 0.1896%
Fund1059 - - - - - - - - 0.0908% 0.0563% 0.0087% 0.0218% 0.0305% 0.0111% 0.0964%
Fund1060 - - 0.0397% 0.0197% 0.0275% 0% 0% 0% 0.0019% 0.0369% 0.0786% 0% 0.1878% 0.0466% 0.0358%
Fund1063 - - - - - 0.0987% 0.0641% 0.0618% 0.2184% 0.1671% 0.0923% 0.0780% 0.0565% 0.1776% 0.0333%
Fund1072 - - - - - - - - - 0.0424% 0.1091% 0.0353% 0.0351% 0.0751% 0.1618%
Fund1076 - - - - - - - 0.2201% 0.5124% 0.7018% 0.3202% 0.1973% 0.3369% 0.2335% 0.1316%
Fund1077 - - - - - - - - 0.0985% 0.2598% 0.2219% 0.1140% 0.1350% 0.2840% 0.1701%
Fund1078 - - - - - 0.1910% 0.2773% 0.2238% 0.2739% 0.1482% 0.0740% 0.0700% 0.0644% 0.2241% 0.2267%
Fund122 - 0.2094% 0.1924% 0.3145% 0.1394% 0.1590% 0.1577% 0.2380% 0.1910% 0.5919% 0.4400% 0.1606% 0.1360% 0.1615% 0.2146%
Fund234 - 0.2613% 0.1425% 0.2161% 0.1810% 0.1252% 0.1018% 0.0702% 0.0720% 0.1824% 0.1789 % 0.0653% 0.0462% 0.0442% 0.1457%
Fund313 - - - 1.2493% 0.6909% 0.4046% 0.2074% 0.1561% 0.1523% 0.5350% 0.2989% 0.0710% 0.1790% 0.0523% 0.0988%
Fund322 - - - 1.0767% 0.3436% 0.4182% 0.2397% 0.2077% 0.1125% 0.5322% 0.6065% 0.3150% 0.1172% 0.2893% 0.2837%
Fund323 - 1.2848% 1.9096% 1.1184% 0.4230% 0.4697% 0.2040% 0.1190% 0.2586% 0.2873% 0.4405% 0.2298% 0.2043% 0.1814% 0.1512%
Fund384 - - 0.6452% 0.7151% 0.2838% 0.2751% 0.2108% 0.2933% 0.4287% 0.6559% 0.2770% 0.2944% 0.2047% 0.1296% 0.1594%
Fund385 - - - 0.0548% 0.2729% 0.1242% 0.0348% 0.0565% 0.0450% 0.1808% 0.1219% 0.0506% 0.0362% 0.0985% 0.1131%
Fund433 - - - - - 0.0930% 0.1650% 0.2077% 0.1346% 0.3575% 0.2015% 0.0926% 0.0565% 0.1926% 0.2420%
Fund434 - - - 0.1347% 0.3143% 0.1482% 0.1803% 0.2214% 0.1084% 0.2664% 0.1579% 0.0414% 0.03% 0.2147% 0.2384%
Fund435 - - - 0.3176% 0.1272% 0.2138% 0.2359% 0.1388% 0.2857% 0.5246% 0.2924% 0.1398% 0.1905% 0.2757% 0.4601%
Fund439 - 0.35% 0.8713% 0.9755% 0.7740% 0.7311% 0.3791% 0.5% 0.5975% 1.4762% 0.6098% 0.2753% 0.2253% 0.1808% 0.3819%
Fund441 - 0.3749% 0.7171% 0.4956% 0.2750% 0.4140% 0.16% 0.2336% 0.2321% 0.4946% 0.3471% 0.1710% 0.1765% 0.1354% 0.0564%
Fund444 - - - 0.0812% 0.5379% 0.1347% 0.1505% 0.1503% 0.0936% 0.0916% 0.0517% 0.0098% 0.0197% 0.0466% 0.0383%
Fund480 - - - 0.3781% 0.5327% 0.5580% 0.4035% 0.7543% 0.8823% 0.3999% 0.2027% 0.3041% 0.3383% 0.3082% 0.3008%
Fund652 - - - 0.0994% 0.5030% 0.1871% 0.1342% 0.1418% 0.1231% 0.0743% 0.0251% 0.0294% 0.0470% 0.0513% 0.0573%
Fund694 - 0.5908% 0.9532% 0.4995% 0.7016% 0.4675% 0.4416% 0.3559% 0.5510% 0.5223% 0.2680% 0.1464% 0.1866% 0.2203% 0.4138%
Fund696 0.08% 0.30% 0.36% 0.44% 0.56% 0.56% 0.64% 0.84% 0.37% 0.92% 1.23% 1.49% 1.78% 1.83% 2.08%
Fund760 - - - 0.0841% 0.5389% 0.1074% 0.1567% 0.1123% 0.1933% 0.1265% 0.0615% 0.0813% 0.0673% 0.0544% 0.0605%
Fund911 - - - 0.4674% 0.2302% 0.4720% 0.2731% 0.1600% 0.1778% 0.4106% 0.1984% 0.1629% 0.0724% 0.1747% 0.1524%
1 Ex-ante performance fees calculated using prices generated by a drift rate µ, are not that different
from ex-ante fees in Table A.1.
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Tab. B.2: Change in Performance Fees from one Period to Another for
Fixed Income Funds.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2104
Fund1015 - - - - - - - 0.0023% 0.0009% 0.0027% 0.0095% 0.0413% 0.0114% 0% 0.0159%
Fund1058 - - - - - - - - 0% 0.0090% 0% 0.0004% 0.0013% 0.0056% 0.0065%
Fund107 - 0.0088% 0.0162% 0.0091% 0.009% 0.0130% 0.0460% 0.0185% 0.0026% 0.0131% 0.002% 0% 0.0023% 0.0001% 0.0007%
Fund1083 - - - - - - - - 0.0790% 0.0987% 0.0011% 0.0001% 0% 0.00260.0354% 2.08%
Fund1185 - - - - - - - - - 0.0068% 0.0048% 0.0034% 0.0007% 0.0051% 0.0068%
Fund1188 - - - - - - - - 0.1572% 0.2065% 0.4421% 0.1468% 0.2857% 0.1922% 0.2482%
Fund162 - 0.0063% 0.0065% 0.0015% 0% 0.0014% 0.0330% 0.0148% 0.0224% 0.1199% 0.0602% 0.0062% 0.0250% 0.0219% 0.0792%
Fund236 - 0% 0.0006% 0.0004% 0.0008% 0.0005% 0% 0.0003% 0% 0.0068% 0.0091% 0.0014% 0% 0% 0.0003%
Fund2512 - - - - - - 0.0638% 0.0061% 0.0009% 0.0304% 0.0001% 0.002% 0.008% 0.0129% 0.0041%
Fund326 - 0.0127% 0.0104% 0.0003% 0.0181% 0.0143% 0.0029% 0.0013% 0.0076% 0.0342% 0.0245% 0.0045% 0.0124% 0.0026% 0.0188%
Fund327 - 0.0247% 0.0495% 0.0234% 0.0013% 0.0020% 0.0138% 0.0071% 0.0391% 0.0182% 0.0236% 0.0181% 0.0653% 0.0092% 0.0399%
Fund343 - 0.0005% 0.0001% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0004% 0.0005% 0.0314% 0.0001% 0% 0.0004% 0.0007% 0.0021%
Fund344 - 0.0030% 0.0312% 0.0061% 0.0031% 0.0534% 0.0046% 0.0001% 0.0034% 0.0035% 0.0018% 0.0008% 0.0013% 0.0058% 0.0010%
Fund347 - 0.0128% 0.0769% 0.0158% 0.0025% 0.0048% 0.0002% 0.0003% 0.0128% 0.0072% 0.0001% 0.0015% 0.0001% 0% 0.0011%
Fund373 - - - 0.0092% 0.0017% 0.0027% 0.0077% 0.0011% 0.0022% 0.0042% 0.0160% 0.0122% 0.0679% 0.0117% 0.0510%
Fund375 - 0.0002% 0.005% 0.0004% 0.0001% 0.0042% 0.0011% 0.0013% 0.0016% 0.0243% 0% 0.0024% 0.0022% 0.0026% 0.0162%
Fund377 - 0% 0.0052% 0.0109% 0.0022% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0052% 0.0008% 0.0002% 0.0008% 0.0005% 0.0173%
Fund380 - 0.0001% 0.0159% 0.0100% 0.0075% 0.0049% 0% 0.0019% 0% 0.0187% 0.0002% 0.0013% 0% 0.0004% 0.0041%
Fund381 - 0.0072% 0.0234% 0.0349% 0.0073% 0.0019% 0.0008% 0.0039% 0% 0.0030% 0.0022% 0.0006% 0.0010% 0.0002% 0.0038%
Fund4133 - - - - - - - - - - - 0.2514% 0.1912% 0.1927% 0.4573%
Fund645 - - - 0.0007% 0.0012% 0% 0.0028% 0.0028% 0.0786% 0.0162% 0.0106% 0.0305% 0.0012% 0.0017% 0.017%
Fund768 - - - - - 0.1316% 0.0255% 0.1941% 0.0894% 0.1141% 0.0061% 0.0052% 0.0003% 0.0645% 0.0015%
Tab. B.3: Change in Performance Fees from one Period to Another for
Money Market Funds.
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2104
Fund1033 - - - - - - - 0.0022% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1042 - - - - - - - 0.0040% 0.0006% 0.1821% 0.0022% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1049 - - - - - 0.0001% 0% 0% 0% 0.006208% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1056 - - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0002% 0.0917% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund106 - 0.0222% 0.0001% 0% 0.0013% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1102 - 0.0066% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1490 - - - - - - - - 0.0024% 0.0068% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund167 - 0.0251% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0010% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund2230 - - - - - - - - 0.0027% 0.0024% 0.0288% 0.0118% 0.0097% 0.0021% 0.0348%
Fund229 - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund280 - - - 0.0040% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0052% 0% 0% 0% 0.0043% 0.0055% 0.0084%
Fund282 - 0.0010% 0% 0.0009% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0020% 0.0013% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.002%
Fund283 - 0.0032% 0% 0.0036% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0002% 0% 0% 0% 0.0098% 0%
Fund285 - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.006% 0%
Fund341 - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0064%
Fund490 - 0.30% 0.36% 0.44% 0.56% 0.56% 0.64% 0.84% 0.37% 0.92% 1.23% 1.49% 1.78% 1.83% 2.08%
Fund589 - - - - - 0.0011% 0.0026% 0.% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund71 - 0.0169% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Appendix C
Actual Performance Fees Paid
Tab. C.1: Change in Actual Performance Fees from one Period to
Another for Equity Funds.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2104
Fund102 1.0919% 3.3126% 2.4191% 0.2682% 1.0179% 0.7610% 0.1187% 1.3600% 0% 0.1284% 0.4065% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1013 - - - - - - 0.5501% 0% 0.1829% 0.0393% 0% 0% 0% 0.6588%
Fund1018 - - - - 0% 0% 0% 1.0825% 0.3941% 0.5221% 0% 0.1061% 0.8455% 0%
Fund1024 - - - - 1.1839% 0.1214% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.4617% 0.3687% 0% 0%
Fund1050 - - - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0246% 0.3509% 0%
Fund1051 - - - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.1518% 0%
Fund1052 - - - - - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1053 - - - - - - 0% 1.1823% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1054 - - - - 0% 0.0518% 0.2478% 0.2771% 0% 0.0220% 0% 0.3842% 0% 0%
Fund1055 - - - - - - 0.0711% 0.9304% 0.1133% 0% 0% 0.6402% 0% 0%
Fund1059 - - - - - - - 0% 0.1251% 0.0084% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1060 - 0.0503% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0311% 0.0559% 0.1797% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1063 - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0.3216% 0% 0.0814% 0.2396% 0.7306% 0.1180% 0%
Fund1072 - - - - - - - - 0.3343% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1076 - - - - - - 0% 4.0304% 0.6548% 0% 0.2406% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1077 - - - - - - - 0.6721% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1078 - - - - 0.9333% 0.3474% 0.5917% 0% 0.0837% 0% 0.6320% 0% 0% 0%
Fund122 1.1023% 1.5766% 0% 0.7613% 0% 0% 0% 0.8693% 0% 1.6569% 0.2250% 0.9145% 0.8819% 0%
Fund234 0.8913% 0.0657% 0.3086% 0.8458% 0% 0% 0% 0.4903% 0% 0% 0.0067% 0.0045% 0.6524% 0%
Fund313 - - 2.5996% 0.9677% 0% 0% 0% 3.6779% 0.1302% 0.0140% 0.8805% 0% 0% 0%
Fund322 - 2.1783% 1.9295% 0% 0% 0% 0.9229% 0.4960% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund323 2.9677% 4.0404% 1.8224% 0.4244% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0689% 0.3731% 0.3341% 0% 0.0076%
Fund384 - 5.4144% 1.1095% 0.8919% 1.1451% 1.1062% 0% 2.8214% 0% 0% 0.5553% 0% 0.0455% 0%
Fund385 - - 0.1858% 0.7616% 0% 0% 0% 0.5105% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0991% 0.0687%
Fund433 - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0.8385% 0.8730% 0.9084% 0% 0% 1.3801% 0%
Fund434 - - 0.5886% 1.1317% 0.0028% 0.4201% 0% 0.9157% 0.6610% 0.3642% 0% 0.3016% 1.2149% 0.1120%
Fund435 - - 1.0508% 0% 1.6425% 0% 0% 1.6149% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0671%
Fund439 - - 1.9121% 2.1778% 0% 0% 0.8236% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund441 4.9631% 5.6961% 3.5458% 4.6352% 0% 0% 0% 1.1589% 0.3861% 0.9295% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund444 3.0293% 3.0325% 1.0893% 1.4985% 0% 0% 0.0383% 0.5809% 0% 0.3466% 0.0600% 0.0502% 0% 0%
Fund480 - - 0% 0% 0% 0.0277% 0.0578% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0914% 0.0317% 0%
Fund652 - - - 0.8803% 0% 0% 0% 4.2587% 0.2742% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund694 - - 0% 0% 0.0890% 0% 0.5685% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.3033% 0% 0%
Fund696 0% 2.8014% 1.1335% 0% 0% 2.9493% 0.3111% 0.0081% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund760 - - 0.1808% 0% 0% 0.5544% 0% 0% 0% 0.0534% 0.3055% 0.6459% 0% 0%
Fund911 - - 1.1755% 2.7437% 0% 0.6887% 0% 0.1745% 0% 0.1168% 0.3407% 0% 0.5283% 0%
1 Actual performance fees are zero, most of the time. We therefore expect the distribution
of the these fees to have a lot of mass at zero. The histogram of the distribution of these
fees is in the next section.
2 These performance fees are a bit higher than the ex-ante performance fees calculated using
spread options. But we can observe that in 2007, performance fees were either low or equal
to zero.
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Tab. C.2: Change in Actual Performance Fees from one Period to
Another for Fixed Income Funds.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2104
Fund1015 - - - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.2231% 0.2775% 0%
Fund1058 - - - - - - - 0.0666% 0.0265% 0.0992% 0% 0% 0.0658% 0%
Fund107 0% 0.0866% 0% 0% 0% 0.1840% 0% 0.0458% 0.0448% 0.0012% 0% 0% 0.0702% 0%
Fund1083 - - - - - - - 0% 0.2427% 0% 0.0088% 0.1625% 0% 0%
Fund1185 - - - - - - - - 0.1687% 0.0577% 0% 0.1878% 0.1682% 0%
Fund1188 - - - - - - - 0% 0.4604% 0.2156% 0.2199% 0% 0.2332% 0%
Fund162 0.1469% 0% 0% 0% 0.0597% 0% 0.0078% 0.2569% 0.2943% 0% 0% 0% 0.1070% 0%
Fund236 0.0734% 0% 0.0528% 0.0026% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.2609% 0.1045% 0.0165% 0.0305% 0%
Fund2512 - - - - - 0.1154% 0.0284% 0.0956% 0.0579% 0.0113% 0% 0% 0.0477% 0%
Fund326 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0653% 0% 0.0604% 0% 0.0317% 0.0472% 0%
Fund327 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.1315% 0.3080% 0.0761% 0.2026% 0.3744% 0.2676% 0.3607% 0.3552% 0%
Fund343 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0098% 0.0135% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund344 0% 0% 0.1296% 0% 0.0303% 0.0126% 0% 0% 0.0542% 0% 0% 0.2044% 0.1192% 0%
Fund347 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0734% 0.2138% 0.0416% 0% 0% 0.0133% 0% 0%
Fund373 0.1061% 0% 0% 0.0167% 0.0501% 0.2080% 0.0324% 0.2493% 0.3624% 0.2862% 0.3477% 0.2013% 0% 0%
Fund375 0.0196% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0189% 0% 0.0074% 0% 0% 0% 0.1840% 0%
Fund377 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0671% 0% 0.0114% 0.1118% 0%
Fund380 0.0399% 0% 0% 0% 0.0169% 0.0114% 0% 0% 0% 0.1496% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund381 0% 0% 0.2609% 0.1026% 0.1699% 0% 0% 0% 0.0033% 0.0059% 0.1299% 0.1079% 0.0127% 0%
Fund4133 - - - - - - - - - - 0% 0% 1.1133% 0%
Fund645 - - 0.0243% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0770% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund768 - - - - 0% 0.6332% 0.6007% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Tab. C.3: Change in Actual Performance Fees from one Period to
Another for Money Market Funds.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2104
Fund1033 - - - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1042 - - - - - 0% 0% 0.0436% 0% 0.0229% 0.0065% 0% 0.0582% 0%
Fund1049 - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0.0735% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1056 - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund106 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0127% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1102 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0011% 0.0274% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund1490 - - - - - - - 0.0882% 0.0122% 0.1233% 0.1322% 0.0522% 0.1119% 0%
Fund167 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0459% 0.0053% 0.0509% 0.0202% 0.0275% 0.0164% 0%
Fund2230 - - - - - - - 0% 0.2503% 0.3884% 0.2805% 0.2158% 0.0744% 0.0069%
Fund229 - - - 0% 0.0159% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund280 - - 0% 0% 0.0111% 0% 0.0098% 0.0576% 0% 0.0333% 0.2190% 0.1390% 0.0816% 0%
Fund282 0.0531% 0% 0% 0.0333% 0% 0% 0.0096% 0.1501% 0.0585% 0.1185% 0.0553% 0.0759% 0.0959% 0%
Fund283 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund285 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0093% 0% 0.0913% 0.0517% 0.2316% 0.0625% 0%
Fund341 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0018% 0.0287% 0.0137% 0.0392% 0.0407% 0.0489% 0.0390% 0.0308%
Fund490 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Fund589 - - - - 0% 0% 0% 0% 0.0259% 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%




We consider the difference between the actual performance fees paid and ex-ante
performance fees estimated. We do this to observe whether the variations between
the two fees are consistent over time or whether they are time dependent and assess
the extent expected performance fees differ from the actual perfromance fees paid.
We can observe from Figure D.1 to Figure D.3 that the differences between
the actual performance fees paid and the ex-ante performance fee estimates is time
dependent. Market conditions have an effect on the difference between ex-ante and
actual performance fees.
Fig. D.1: Difference between Actual and Ex-ante Performance Fees for Equity
Funds.
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Fig. D.2: Difference between Actual and Ex-ante Performance Fees for Fixed
Income Funds.
Fig. D.3: Difference between Actual and Ex-ante Performance Fees for Money
Market Funds.
